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Abstract
Non-centralized recommendation-based decision making is a central feature of several social and technological processes,
such as market dynamics, peer-to-peer file-sharing and the web of trust of digital certification. We investigate the properties
of trust propagation on networks, based on a simple metric of trust transitivity. We investigate analytically the percolation
properties of trust transitivity in random networks with arbitrary in/out-degree distributions, and compare with numerical
realizations. We find that the existence of a non-zero fraction of absolute trust (i.e. entirely confident trust) is a requirement
for the viability of global trust propagation in large systems: The average pair-wise trust is marked by a discontinuous
transition at a specific fraction of absolute trust, below which it vanishes. Furthermore, we perform an extensive analysis of
the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) web of trust, in view of the concepts introduced. We compare different scenarios of trust
distribution: community- and authority-centered. We find that these scenarios lead to sharply different patterns of trust
propagation, due to the segregation of authority hubs and densely-connected communities. While the authority-centered
scenario is more efficient, and leads to higher average trust values, it favours weakly-connected ‘‘fringe’’ nodes, which are
directly trusted by authorities. The community-centered scheme, on the other hand, favours nodes with intermediate in/
out-degrees, in detriment of the authorities and its ‘‘fringe’’ peers.
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Introduction
Several social and technological systems rely on the notion of
trust, or recommendation, where agents must make their decision
based on the trustworthiness of other agents, with which they
interact. One example are buyers in markets [1], who may share
among themselves their experiences with different sellers, or
lenders which may share a belief that a given borrower will not be
able to pay back [2]. Another example are peer-to-peer file-
sharing programs [3], which often must know, without relying on a
central authority, which other programs act in a fair manner, and
which act selfishly. In the same line, an even more direct example
is the web of trust of digital certification, such as the Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP) system [4,5], where regular individuals must certify
the authenticity of other individuals with digital signatures. In all
these systems, the agents lack global information, and must infer
the reliability of other agents, based solely on the opinion of trusted
peers, thus forming a network of trust. In this paper, we present an
analysis of trust propagation based on the notion of transitivity:I f
agent a trusts agent b, and agent b trusts agent c, then, to some
extent, agent a will also trust agent c. Based on this simple concept,
we define a trust metric with which the reliability of any reachable
agent may be inferred. Instead of concentrating on the minutiae of
trust propagation semantics, we focus on the topological aspect of
trust networks, using concepts from network theory [6]. Using
random networks as a simple model, we investigate the necessary
conditions for trust to ‘‘percolate’’ through an entire system. We
then apply the concepts introduced to investigate in detail the PGP
web of trust, possibly the best ‘‘real’’ example of a trust
propagation system, which is completely accessible for investiga-
tion. We focus on the role of the strongly connected nodes in the
network — the so called trust authorities — which represent a
different paradigm of trust delegation, in comparison to the
decentralized community-based approach, which is also heavily
present in the network.
This paper is divided as follows. In section 1 we define the trust
metric used; in section 2 we consider the problem of trust
percolation in random networks with different trust weight
distributions. In in section 3 we turn to the analysis of the PGP
network, and provide an extensive analysis of its topology, and of
trust propagation according to different trust distribution scenarios.
Finally, we provide some final remarks and a conclusion.
Analysis
1 Trust metric
Trust is the measure of belief that a given entity will act as one
expects. It is often associated with positive, desirable attributes, but
it may not always be the case (e.g. one may have trust that
someone will act undesirably). Humans use trust to make decisions
when more direct information is unavailable. In general, humans
will decide their level of trust based on arbitrary, heuristic rules,
since there is no formal consensus on how to evaluate trust. We
will deliberately avoid the detailed formalization of these rules, and
instead rely on two simplifications: 1. We will treat trust simply as
a probability that a given assessment about an agent is true or false
(e.g. fair/reliable or not); 2. We further assume that this belief is
transitive, i.e. if agent a trust agent b, which in turn trusts agent c,
then a will also trust c, to some extent. This makes trust
propagation easier to analyse, while retaining its most intuitive
properties.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e18384We will consider a system of N agents which form a directed
trust network: Each agent v (represented by a vertex, or node) has
a number of interactions (represented by directed edges, or links)
with other agents fuig for which a value cv,ui [ ½0,1  of direct trust is
defined a priori, and which can be interpreted as a probability. This
value represents a direct experience agent v had with ui, which is
not inferred from any other agent. We note that this value fully
reflects the directed nature of the network, so that if there is also an
edge ui?v, the value of cui,v is in independent of cv,ui — in other
words, direct trust does not need to be reciprocal. Additionally, we
do not assume that there is an inherent self-loop from each vertex
to itself. If a self-loop v?v exists, we do not ascribe any special
meaning to the diagonal element cv,v, which can be arbitrarily
chosen just as any other direct trust value. We then define the
inferred trust tij [ ½0,1  from agent i to any agent j, which is somehow
based on the values of cv,ui, which issomehowbasedonthevaluesof
cv,ui. In a simple situation where there is only one possible path
between any two given nodes (e.g. the network is a directed tree, as
theexampleonthe left inFig.1),one couldsimplymultiplythevalues
of c along the single path to obtain t,e . g .tAlice,Bob~c1c3,i nt h e
example of Fig. 1 (throughout this work, a path is always considered
to be self-avoiding, i.e. no edge or vertex is visited twice). In general,
h o w e v e r ,t h es i t u a t i o nm a yb em o r ec o m p l i c a t e d ,a si nt h ee x a m p l e
on the right of Fig. 1, where there is a variety of possible (often
‘‘contradictory’’) transitive paths between most pairs of nodes.
Perhaps the simplest way of defining a trust metric would be to
consider only the best transitivity path between two nodes, i.e., the one
where the trust transitivity is maximum,
su,v~max P
feig
cei
  
, Vfeig[PuVv, ð1Þ
where PuVv is the set of all paths from u to v, feig is the set of
edges in a given path, and ce is the direct trust associated with a
given edge (if there is no path from u to v, we consider the value of
su,v to be zero. Additionally, we consider the diagonal values of
best trust to be equal to one, i.e. su,u~1). This definition is an
attractive one, since it corresponds directly to the concept of
minimum distance on weighted graphs, which is defined as the
sum of weights along the path with the smallest sum. This is easily
seen by noticing that Pfeig cei~expf{
X
feig veig, with
vei~{lncei§0 being the edge weights (with the special value
of vei~? if cei~0). However, it is clear that this approach leads
to an optimistic bias, since the best path obviously favors large
values of trust, and uses only a small portion of the information
available in the network. As an illustration consider the network on
the right of Fig. 1, where the value of sAlice,Bob is
1|0:9|0:6~0:54, via Dave and Chuck. However, if Chuck is
directly consulted, the transitivity drops to 0:3|0:6~0:18.I n
principle, there is no reason to prefer any of the two assessments
over the other. One may attempt to rectify this by considering
instead all possible paths between two nodes,
~ t tu,v~
X
uVv
vuVv P
e[uVv
ce
X
uVv
vuVv
, ð2Þ
where vuVv is a weight associated with a given path uVv.I t
should be chosen to minimize the effect of a very large number of
paths with very low values of trust, without introducing an
optimistic bias on the final trust value. One apparently good
choice is to consider the transitivity value of the path itself, but not
including the last edge,
vuVv~ P
e[uVv cez(1{ce)d(e,e?v) ½  , ð3Þ
where e?v is the last edge in the path, and d is the Kronecker
delta. The usage of Eq. 3 is apparently appropriate since it not
only avoids a bias in the final value of ~ t tu,v, but also vuVv has a
simple interpretation as being the value of trust on the final
recommendation, which is completed by the last edge. While this
may seem reasonable, and uses all available information in the
network, it has two major drawbacks: 1. It is very computation-
ally costly to consider all possible paths between two nodes, even
in moderately sized networks. It would represent an unreasonable
effort on part of the agents to use all this information. 2.
Computed as in Eq. 2, the value of ~ t tu,v has the unsettling
behaviour of tending to zero, whenever the number of paths
become large (as they often are), even when paths are differently
weighted. Consider a simple scenario where the network is a
complete graph, i.e. all possible edges in the network exist, and all
of them have the same direct trust value c. Since there are
N{2
l
  
l! paths of length lz1 between any two vertices, the
value of inferred trust between any two nodes can be calculated
as
Figure 1. Examples of trust networks. Left: A directed tree. Right: A more realistic example. The edges in blue are the ones which contribute to
the value of trust from Bob to Alice, according to Eq. 7.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g001
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XN{2
l~0
N{2
l
  
l!c2lz1
XN{2
l~0
N{2
l
  
l!cl
ð4Þ
~cN{1
exp
1
c2
  
C N{1,
1
c2
  
exp
1
c
  
C N{1,
1
c
   ð5Þ
ƒcN{1exp
1
c2 {
1
c
  
, ð6Þ
where C is the upper incomplete gamma function, from which it is
easy to see that limN??~ t tu,v~0 for cv1. This is an undesired
behavior, since one would wish that such highly connected
topologies (which often occur as subgraphs of social networks,
known as cliques) would result in higher values of trust. In order to
compensate for this one would have to use a more aggressive
weighting of the possible paths. We propose the following
modification, which combines some features of both previous
approaches: Instead of considering all possible paths, we consider
only those with the largest weights to all the in-neighbours of the
target vertex, as shown in Fig. 2. This leads to a trust metric
defined as
tu,v~
X
w Aw,v sG\fvg
u,w
   2
cw,v
X
w Aw,vsG\fvg
u,w
, ð7Þ
where the path weights are the best trust transitivity to the in-
neighbours, sG\fvg
u,w , which are calculated after removing the target
vertex from the graph (so that it cannot influence its own trust),
and Aw,v is the adjacency matrix, defined as
Aw,v~
1 if there is an edge w?v,
0 otherwise:
 
ð8Þ
Like for su,v, we assume that tu,v~0 if there is no path from u to v,
and tu,u~1, for any u. We note that the term sG\fvg
u,w
   2
comes
from the multiplication of the trust being averaged, sG\fvg
u,w cw,v, and
its corresponding weight sG\fvg
u,w . We call this trust metric pervasive
trust, and it corresponds to the intuitive strategy of searching for the
nodes with a direct interaction with the target node (the final
arbitrators), and weighting their opinions according to the best
possible trust transitivity leading to them. It can be seen that this
definition does not suffer from the same problems of Eq. 2, again
by considering the same complete graph example, with uniform
direct trust c. Since in this situation every target vertex has N{2
in-neighbours different from the source, and the shortest path to
each of these in-neighbours is of length one, the value of pervasive
trust can be easily calculated as
tu,v~
(N{2)c3zc
(N{2)cz1
, ð9Þ
for u=v, which converges to tu,v&c2 for N&1. Thus the indirect
opinions with value c2 dominate the direct trust value c, but the
inferred value does not vanish, as with the definition of Eqs.2 and 3.
Considering again the example on the right of Fig. 1, we obtain the
value tAlice,Bob~(0:92|0:6z(0:9|0:7)
2|0:3)=(0:9z0:9|0:7)
&0:4, from the edges outlined in blue in the figure. Additionally,
the definition of pervasive trust works as one would expect in the
trivial example on theleftof Fig.1,wheresu,v and tu,v have thesame
values.
We note that the numerical computation of su,v can be done by
using Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm [7,8], which has a
complexity of O(NlogN). Thus the entire matrix su,v can be
calculated in O(N2logN) time. The same algorithm can be used to
calculate tu,v, but since each target vertex needs to be removed
from the graph, and thus a new search needs to be made for each
different target, this results in O(N3logN) time. It is possible to
improve this by performing searches in the reversed graph, i.e., for
each target vertex v, the contribution to tu,v from all sources u can
be calculated simultaneously, after v is removed, by performing a
single reversed search from each of the in-neighbours of v to each
source u. This way, the entire tu,v matrix can be computed in
O(kN2logN) time (where k~E=N is the average in/out-degree of
the network), which is comparable to the computation time of su,v
for sparse graphs.
1.1 Comparison with other trust metrics. Other trust
metrics have been proposed in the literature, mainly by computer
scientists, seeking to formalize the notion of trust in peer-to-peer
computer systems. Some are quite detailed, like the usage of
subjective logic by Jøsang et al [9], and others are comparable with
the simplistic approach taken in this work, such as Eigentrust [3]
and more recently TrustWebRank [10]. These last metrics are
based on the notion of feedback centrality [8], which is usually defined
as some linear system involving the adjacency matrix. The
Eigentrust metric requires the trust network to be a stochastic
matrix (i.e. the sum of the trust values of the out-edges of all
vertices must sum to unity) and the inferred trust values are given
by the steady state distribution of the corresponding Markov chain
(i.e. the left eigenvector of the stochastic matrix with unity
eigenvalue, hence the name of the metric). Thus the inferred trust
values are global properties, independent of any source vertex (i.e.
non-personalized), which is non-intuitive. Additionally, the
requirement that the trust network is stochastic means that only
relative values of trust are measured, and the absolute information is
Figure 2. Illustration of the paths used to calculate tu,v
according to Eq. 7. The vertices wi are the in-neighbours of v, and
the values si~sG\fvg
u,wi are the values of best trust (Eq. 1) from u to wi, with
vertex v removed from the graph.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g002
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presence of loops in the network, which get counted multiple
times, which is also non-intuitive as far as trust transitivity is
concerned. The metric TrustWebRank [10] tries to fix some of
these problems by borrowing ideas from the PageRank [11]
algorithm, resulting in a metric which also requires a stochastic
matrix, but is personalised. However, in order for the algorithm to
converge, it depends on the introduction of an damping factor which
eliminates the contribution of longer paths in the network,
independently of its trust value. This is an a priori assumption
that these paths are not relevant, and may not correspond to
reality. Additionally, the strange role of loops in the network is the
same as in the Eigentrust metric. However, since there is no
consensus on how a trust propagates, and the notion of trust lacks
a formal, universally accepted definition, in the end there is no
‘‘correct’’ or ‘‘wrong’’ metric. We only emphasize that our
approach is derived directly from the simple notion of trust
transitivity, is easy to interpret, propagates absolute values of trust,
and makes no assumption whatsoever about the network topology,
and direct trust distribution.
Results
1 Trust percolation
Trust transitivity is based on the multiplication of direct trust
values, which may tend to be low if the paths become long.
Therefore, it is a central problem to determine if the trust
transitivity between two randomly chosen vertices of a large
network vanishes if the system becomes very large. This provides
important information about the viability of trust transitivity on
large systems. As a simple network model, we will consider
random directed networks with arbitrary in/out-degree distribu-
tions [12]. We will also suppose that the direct trust values in the
range between c and czdc will be independently distributed with
probability rc(c)dc, where rc(c) is an arbitrary probability density
function (PDF). The objective of this section is to calculate the
average best trust transitivity SsT, given by Eq. 1, and the average
pervasive trust StT, Eq. 7, between randomly chosen pairs of
source and target vertices. In random networks, the value of
average pervasive trust will be given simply as StT~SsTScT, since
the best paths to the in-neighbours of a given vertex are
uncorrelated, and the probability that they pass through the node
itself tend to zero, in the limit of large network size. Therefore we
need only to concern ourselves with the average best trust
transitivity SsT.
Directed networks are composed of components of different
types and sizes: For each vertex there will be an out-component,
which is the set of vertices reachable from it, and an in-component,
which is the set of vertices for which it is reachable. A maximal set
of vertices which are mutually reachable is called a strongly connected
component. Random graphs often display a phase transition in the
size and number of these components: If the number of edges is
large enough, there will be the sudden formation of a giant (in-,
out-, strongly connected) component, which spans a non-vanishing
fraction of the network [6,12]. The existence of these giant
components is obviously necessary for a non-vanishing value of
trust to exist between most vertices, but it is not sufficient, since it is
still necessary that the multiplication of direct trust values along
most shortest paths do not become vanishingly small. As an
illustration, consider a sparse graph (i.e. with finite average in/out-
degree), with a arbitrary in/out-degree distributions. In the
situation where there is a sufficiently large giant out-component
in the graph, the average shortest path from a randomly chosen
root vertex to the rest of the network is given approximately [12]
by
l&
ln(N=SkT)
ln(Sk2T=SkT)
, ð10Þ
independently of the out-degree distribution (as long as SkT and
Sk2T are finite positive), where N is the number of vertices, SkT is
the average out-degree and Sk2T is the average number of second
out-neighbours, and it is assumed that N&SkT and Sk2T&SkT
(an analogous expression for the distance from the entire network
to a randomly chosen target can be obtained by replacing SkT and
Sk2T with the average in-degree and second in-neighbours, SjT
and Sj2T respectively). Since the edges are weighted, the average
length of the best paths can differ from l, but can never be smaller.
Thus, an upper bound on the average best trust is given by
SsT~o(maxfcig
l),
where maxfcig is the maximum value of direct trust in the
network. In the situation where maxfcigv1, we have that
limN??SsT~o(0), since limN?? l~?. Therefore, if there are
no values of c~1 in the network, the average trust will always be
Figure 3. Neighbourhood of vertex v with out-neighbours fwig
with direct trust fcig. The best trust from v to an arbitrary vertex u,
sv,u, is given as a function of fcig and fswi,ug, according to Eq. 11.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g003
Figure 4. Schematic representation of the self-consistency for rz(sz) in Eq. 14. Each term corresponds to the probability of the vertex
having a given number of out-neighbours, and the maximum best trust transitivity being equal the desired value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g004
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vanishing values of average trust is either to have a non-zero
fraction of c~1 (which we will call absolute trust), or for the network
to be dense, such that l remains finite for N??.
With the above consideration in mind, we now move to
calculate the average trust transitivity values. We will obtain a self-
consistency condition for the distribution of best trust transitivity
values, by describing the direct neighbourhood of a single vertex,
similarly to what was done in [12] to obtain the distribution of
component sizes. For simplicity, we will consider only the situation
where the in- and out-degrees of the vertices are uncorrelated. The
approach is based on the following observation. Consider two
randomly selected vertices, v and u, and the best trust from v to u,
s:sv,u, which is distributed according to a PDF rs(s). Let fwz
i g
be the set of out-neighbours of v (we assume that the probability of
u[fwz
i g vanishes for N??), with direct trust values fcig,a s
illustrated in Fig. 3. It is clear that the value of s can be written as a
function of the best trust from each out-neighbour wz
i to u, swz
i ,u,
as
s~maxfciswz
i ,ug: ð11Þ
We note that an analogous equation can be obtained in the
opposite direction, by considering the in-neighbours fw{
i g of u,
with direct trust values fc’ig, and their best trust values fsv,w{
i g,
s~maxfc’isv,w{
i g: ð12Þ
Each equation above can be used to establish a self-consistency
equation for appropriately defined auxiliary distributions, which
can be combined to obtain rs(s), as will be explained below. The
main intuitive notion which will be explored is that on
uncorrelated random graphs, the properties of a given vertex
and its out/in-neighbours should be the same on average.
Therefore, certain distributions associated with variables on the
left hand side of Eqs. 11 and 12, are also associated with variables
which appear on the right hand side. In order to express the self-
consistencies in detail, we need to introduce two auxiliary
variables sz and s{ and their PDFs rz(sz) and r{
s (s{). The
PDF rz
s (sz) will be associated with Eq. 11 and the out-degree
distribution, and r{
s (s{) with Eq. 12 and the in-degree
distribution. Without loss of generality, we describe only the
self-consistency for rz
s (sz) in detail, since the development for
r{
s (s{) can be obtained in an entirely analogous fashion, by
replacing the out-degree with the in-degree. In order to transform
Eq. 11 into a self-consistency equation, we need to define yet
another auxiliary distribution, ~ b b
z(x), which is the cumulative
probability that szcvx,w i t hc being the direct trust, distributed
according to rc(c),g i v e nb y
Figure 5. Average values of best trust S SsT T and pervasive trust S StT T as a function of the fraction of edges with absolute trust c. Top
left: Networks with Poisson in- and out-degree distributions, and uniform trust distribution. Top right and bottom right: Poisson distribution, and
single-valued trust distribution. Bottom left: Zipf distribution, and single-valued trust distribution. Solid lines correspond to analytical solutions, and
symbols to numerical realizations of several networks of different sizes: 104 (red), 105 (green) and 106 (blue) nodes. The dashed line shows the average
direct trust ScT~(cz1)=2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g005
Trust Transitivity in Social Networks
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e18384~ b b
z(x)~
ð1
0
dcrc(c)~ r rz
s (x=c), ð13Þ
where ~ r rz
s (sz)~
Ð sz
0 dxrz
s (x) is the cumulative distribution of sz.
Now, if we suppose that the best trust values fswz
i ,ug from the out-
neighbours fwz
i g of v are distributed according to rz
s (swz
i ,u),w e
obtain that the cumulative probability that the right hand side of
Eq. 11 is less than x is given by ½~ b b
z(x) 
k, where k is the out-degree
of vertex v. A full self-consistency equation for rz
s (sz) can be
obtained by supposing that the value of s is distributed according
to the same distribution as swz
i ,u, and considering all the possible
out-degrees and their respective probabilities, as follows (see Fig. 4):
The cumulative probability that svrzsz, where rz is an
arbitrary value which will not influence the self-consistency, will
be given by the sum of the probabilities that vertex v has out-
degree k multiplied by the cumulative probability that
maxfc’isv,w{
i gvrzsz for all k out-neighbours. Concisely, this
can be expressed as
~ r rz
s (sz)~
X
k
pk½~ b b
z(sz) 
k, ð14Þ
where pk is the out-degree distribution. Note that while Eq. 14 is a
self-consistency condition from which rz
s (sz) can be obtained
(given rc(c) and pk), it cannot be used to obtain rs(s) directly,
because of the arbitrary value rz which does not influence Eq. 14.
We note however that, as mentioned previously, Eq. 12 can be
used to obtain an equation for s{ and r{
s (s{) which is entirely
analogous to Eq. 14, with pk replaced by the in-degree distribution
pj. This equation is also not affected by an analogous arbitrary
value r{. Since we have two self-consistency relationships which
are defined up to two arbitrary values, they can be used to
complement each other by formulating the ansatz that rz~s{
and r{~sz, which leads to
s~szs{: ð15Þ
With this connection it is possible to obtain rs(s) from rz
s (sz) and
r{
s (s{) simply as
rs(s)~
ð1
0
dszrz
s (sz)r{
s (s=sz)=sz,o r ð16Þ
~
ð1
0
ds{rz
s (s=s{)r{
s (s{)=s{, ð17Þ
and the average SsT~
Ð 1
0 dssrs(s) more directly as
SsT~
ð1
0
ð1
0
ds{dszs{szr{
s (s{)rz
s (sz) ð18Þ
~Ss{TSszT: ð19Þ
By rewriting Eq. 14 in terms of the generating functions of the in-
and out-degree distributions,
G(z)~
X
j
pjzj F(z)~
X
k
pkzk, ð20Þ
one obtains the self-consistency equations in a more compact
form,
~ r r{
s (s)~F(~ b b
{(s)) ð21Þ
~ r rz
s (s)~G(~ b b
z(s)): ð22Þ
These are integral equations, for which there are probably no
general closed form solutions. However, it is possible to solve them
numerically by successive iterations from an initial distribution,
which we chose as ~ r r0(s)~H(s{1), where H(x) is the Heaviside
step function. From the numerical solutions the average values can
be obtained as Ss{T~
ð1
0
dsr{
s (s)s~1{
ð1
0
ds~ r r{
s (s) (where the
last expression is obtained by integration by parts), and in
analogous fashion for SszT. The average value of best trust
transitivity SsT is then given by Eq. 19.
We turn now to the conditions necessary for non-vanishing
average trust transitivity. Both Eqs. 21 and 22 accept the trivial
solution ~ r r{=z
s (s)~H(s), which corresponds to r{=z
s (s)~d(s), i.e.
the average best trust is zero. As discussed previously, for other
solutions to be possible, we need to consider a non-vanishing
fraction of edges with absolute trust c~1 in the network. Here we
will consider direct trust distributions of the form,
rc(c)~cd(c{1)z(1{c)r’c(c), ð23Þ
which correspond to a fraction c of edges with c~1, and a
complementary fraction (1{c) with c given with probability
density r’c(c). We will consider two different versions of r’c(c):A
uniform distribution r’c(c)~1, and a single-valued distribution
r’c(c)~d(c{g), with g~1=2. We will use two different in/out-
degree distributions, the Poisson and Zipf, and their respective
generating functions,
pj~
SjT
je{SjT
j!
G(z)~eSjT(z{1) ð24Þ
Table 1. Summary of statistics for the whole PGP network
(above) and the largest strongly connected component
(below).
NE SjT ra c
2513677 703142 &0:28 0:45 {0:02152(12) 0.02321(9)
39796 301498 &7:58 0:69 0:0332(3) 0:461(2)
N is the number of vertices (keys), and E is the number of edges (signatures),
SjT is the average in-degree, r is the average reciprocity, a is the assortativity
coefficient and c is the average clustering coefficient.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.t001
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j{t
f(t)
G(z)~
Lit(z)
f(t)
, ð25Þ
where f(t) is the Riemann f function, and Lin(x) is the nth
polylogarithm of x. For simplicity, we will consider only the
situation where pj~pk, and both the in-degree j and the out-
degree k are independently distributed.
In Fig. 5 are plotted the values of SsT and StT, as a function of
c, for the different distributions. It is also compared with numerical
computations on actual network realizations of different sizes. The
main feature observed is a first-order transition from vanishing
trust to positive trust, at specific values of c. This is an interesting
feature, since it seems at first to be at odds with traditional
percolation theory, which predicts a second-order transition.
However, we point out that the order parameter SsT is very
different from what usually characterises a percolation transition,
namely the relative size of the largest connected component.
Although we used a similar technique to obtain SsT, there is no a
priori reason to expect its transition to be continuous, and indeed it
seems not to be the case. It is possible, however, to identify a very
direct connection to the conventional percolation transition, given
by the values c  where the transition for SsT occurs: If one
considers the subgraph composed of all the vertices and only the
edges with c~1, it can be easily concluded that this subgraph is a
random graph on its own, since the values of c are randomly
distributed on the edges. Its in/out-degree distributions will in
general be different than for the complete graph, with an average
given by cSkT. For a Poisson distribution, the usual percolation
transition occurs when the average in/out-degree is one [12],
which, for the c~1 subgraph, corresponds to c ~1=SkT.T h e s e
are indeed the transition points observed for SsT,w h e ni n / o u t -
degree distributions are Poisson. Therefore, the transition values
c  correspond exactly to the critical values of the formation of a
giant component of the subgraph composed only of edges with
c~1. It is worth observing that on finite graphs, the average trust
does not vanish very rapidly, and is still non-zero for relatively
large networks with N~106 vertices, even when c~0.T h i s
seems to be simply a finite size effect, intensified by the the so-
called small-world property, where the average shortest path
scales slowly as l*lnN, as in Eq. 10. As can be seen in in Fig. 5,
for some of the networks of size up to 106 vertices, the values of
vsw below the transition have not yet converged to a value
which no longer depends on N, which clearly indicates a finite
size effect. This is further corroborated by the values of SsT for
c~0, which are sometimes above zero, even though in this
situation they must be equal to zero in the limit N??,a s
explained in detail previously. This very strong finite size effect
means also that in practical situations where networks are large
but finite, cwc  it is not a strictly necessary condition for system-
wide trust propagation.
Another interesting feature is the behaviour of the average trust
in graphs with Zipf in/out-degree distribution. There, the
transition to positive trust is of second order, and the critical
points are also c~1=SkT. Additionally, the values of average trust
are smaller than in networks with Poisson in/out-degree
distribution and the same average in/out-degree, for intermediary
values of c after the transitions. This is due to the smaller path
multiplicity of graphs with scale-free distribution: Even though the
Figure 6. Number of keys and signatures as a function of time for the strongly connected component of the PGP network, and
waiting time distribution between new keys and signatures. The straight lines are power-laws Dt{j, with j~1:3 (top) and j~0:18 (bottom).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g006
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of alternative paths is also smaller, due to the dominance of
vertices with smaller in/out-degree. Thus, if the shortest path
happens to have a small trust value, there will be a higher
probability there will not be an alternative path. In Fig. 5 it is
shown also the average best trust for 1vtv2, for which the
average in/out-degree diverges. For such dense networks, the
values of SsT are above zero for all values of cw0, which means
that any small (but existing) fraction of edges with c~1 can be
used by most shortest paths in this case.
2 The Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Network
In this section we investigate trust propagation on the Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) network. In a broad manner PGP (or more
precisely the OpenPGP standard [13]) refers to a family of
computer programs for encryption and decryption of files, as well
as data authentication, i.e. generation and verification of digital
signatures. It is often used to sign, encrypt and decrypt email. It
implements a scheme of public-key cryptography [14], where the
keys used for encryption/decryption are split in two parts, one
private and one public. Both parts are related in way, such that the
Figure 7. Several statistical properties of the PGP Network. Top left: In- and out-degree distributions, pj and pk respectively. The solid line
corresponds to a power-law with exponent 2:5. Top right: Average in- and out-degree of the nearest out-neighbours, as a function of the in- and
out-degree. Bottom left: Average lustering coefficient as a function of in- and out-degree. Bottom right: Distribution of community sizes, for the
unmodified and shuffled versions of the network. The solid lines correspond to power-laws with exponent 2:3 (top) and 3:8 (bottom).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g007
Figure 8. Reciprocity statistics of the PGP network. Left: Average out-degree as a function of the in-degree of the same vertex. Right:
Average edge reciprocity, as a function of the in or out-degree of the source vertex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g008
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signatures, and the public key only for encryption and signature
verification. Thus any user is capable of sending encrypted
messages and verifying the signature of a specific user with her
public key, but only this user can decrypt these messages and
generate signatures, using her private key, which she should never
disclose. The public keys are usually published in so-called key
servers, which mutually synchronize their databases, and thus
become global non-centralized repositories of public keys.
However, the mere existence of public key in a key server,
associated with a given identity (usually a name and an email
address) is no guarantee that this key really belongs to the
respective person, since there is no inherent verification in the
submission process. This problem is solved by the implementation
of the so-called web of trust of PGP keys, whereby a user can attach
a signature to the public key of another user, indicating she trusts
that this key belongs to its alleged owner. The validity of a given
key can then be inferred by transitivity, in a self-organized
manner, without the required presence of a central trust authority.
As such, this system represents an almost perfect example of a trust
propagation through transitivity.
As a rule, key signatures should only be made after careful
verification, which usually requires the two parties to physically
meet. Such a requirement transforms the web of trust into a
snapshot of a global social network of acquaintances, since the vast
majority of keys correspond to human users, which tend to sign
keys of people with which they normally interact. There is also a
tendency to sign keys (upon verification) from people which do not
belong to a close circle of acquaintances, with the sole purpose of
strengthening the web of trust with more connections. This
tendency is well reflected by the so-called ‘‘key signing parties’’,
where participants meet (usually after a large technological
conference) to massively sign each other’s keys [15]. Thus the
structure of the PGP network reflects the global dynamics of self-
organization of human peers in a social context.
This section is divided in two parts. In the first part we present
some aspects of the topology and temporal organization of the
network. In the second part we analyze the trust transitivity in the
network, in view of the trust metric we discussed previously.
2.1 Network topology. The PGP network used in this work
was obtained from a snapshot of the globally synchronized SKS key
servers (available at http://key-server.de/dump/) in November
2009. It is composed of N&2:5|106 keys and E&7|105
signatures with a very low average in-degree of SjT~0:28. This
means that many keys are isolated and contain no signatures.
Therefore we will concentrate on the largest strongly connected
component, i.e. a maximal set of vertices for which there is a path
between any pair of vertices in the set. The number of vertices
N&4|104 in this component is much smaller, but the network is
much denser, with on average SjT&7:58 signatures per key (see
summarized data in table 1). It represents the de facto web of trust,
since the rest of the network is so sparsely connected that no trust
transitivity can be inferred from it. We note that keys may have
multiple ‘‘subkeys’’ which correspond to different identities (usually
different email addresses from the same person) and which can
individually sign other subkeys. For simplicity, in this work we have
collapsed subkeys into single keys, and possible multiple signatures
into a single signature. We have also discarded invalid, and revoked
keys and signatures.
The number of keys and signatures in the strongly connected
component has been increasing over time, as shown in Fig. 6. The
number of keys (which are now valid) was approximately the same
for some time and then slightly decreased for a period up to
around 2002, and has been increasing with an approximately
constant rate since then. We note that the number of keys may
decrease, since keys can expire or be revoked. The number of
signatures, on the other hand, seems to be increasing with an
accelerated rate, with an approximately constant acceleration,
which is similar to the rate of growth of the number of keys. This
means that the average in/out-degree of the network is increasing
with time, as can be seen in Fig. 6. Keys and signatures grow in an
organized manner, as shown by the waiting time distribution
between the creation of two subsequent keys or signatures, as
shown in Fig. 6. These distributions are broad for several orders of
magnitude, from the order of seconds to days, approximately
following a power-law in this region. The fact that keys and
signatures are often created only seconds apart, and the waiting
time distribution lacks any discernible characteristic scale, except
Table 2. The eleven keys with the largest number of signatures in the network, their respective in-degree j, out-degree k, average
in-degree of the nearest out-neighbours SjTout, clustering coefficient c, and date of creation.
Key ID Name jk SjTout c Date
D2BB0D0165D0FD58 CA Cert Signing Authority (Root CA)
,gpg@cacert.org.
965 1507 17:5(8) 0:0031 2003-07-11
2F951508AAE6022E Karlheinz Geyer (TUD)
,geyerk.fv.tu@nds.tu-darmstadt.de.
661 744 59(2) 0:0660 2004-12-07
DBD245FCB3B2A12C ct magazine CERTIFICATE
,pgpCA@ct.heise.de.
597 1348 18:3(12) 0:0033 1999-05-11
69D2A61DE263FCD4 Kurt Gramlich ,kurt@skolelinux.de. 406 644 71(3)) 0:0807 2002-10-17
948FD6A0E10F502E Marcus Frings ,protagonist@gmx.net. 387 381 82(5) 0:1110 2002-03-22
29BE5D2268FD549F Martin Michlmayr ,tbm@cyrius.com. 385 436 56(4) 0:0499 1999-08-04
566D362CEE0977E8 Jens Kubieziel ,jens@kubieziel.de. 369 414 73(4) 0:1098 2002-08-23
3F101691D98502C5 Elmar Hoffmann ,elho@elho.net. 352 1 348 0:1122 2005-02-17
957952D7CF3401A9 Elmar Hoffmann ,elho@elho.net. 348 311 84(5) 0:1086 2005-02-17
CE8A79D798016DC7 Josef Spillner ,josef@coolprojects.org. 344 429 71(4) 0:1007 2001-05-22
89CD4B21607559E6 Benjamin Hill (Mako) ,mako@atdot.cc. 325 319 70(5) 0:0801 2000-07-13
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.t002
Trust Transitivity in Social Networks
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e18384for a cut-off at large times (*1 day), shows that the network does
not grow in a purely random fashion (which would generate
exponentially-distributed waiting times, as in an homogeneous
Poisson process. If the Poisson process is non-homogeneous, with a
constantly accelerating rate, the waiting times would follow instead
a Weibull distribution, which also has an exponential tail), and
serves as a signature of an underlying organized growth process.
We will characterize the topology of the network by its in/out-
degree distribution and nearest-neighbours in/out-degree corre-
lations, as well as other standard network measures such as
clustering [16], reciprocity [17] and community structure [18]. We
will pay special attention to the most highly connected vertices,
some of which correspond to so-called certificate authorities and
display a distinct connectivity pattern, which has a special meaning
for trust propagation.
The network has very heterogeneous in/out-degree distribu-
tions, as can be seen in Fig. 7, with some keys having on the order
of 103 signatures. They are possibly compatible with a power-law
with exponent *2:5 for large in/out-degrees, but the distributions
are not broad enough for a precise identification. The number of
signatures on a given key (the in-degree) and the number of
signatures made by a the same key (the out-degree) are strongly
correlated, as can be seen in Fig. 8, which shows the average out-
degree SkT as a function of the in-degree j. This is explained by
the high reciprocity of the edges in the network, i.e. if a key a signs
a key b, there is a very high probability that key b signs key a as
well. This is easy to understand, since key verification usually
requires physical presence, and both parties take the opportunity
to mutually verify each other keys in the same encounter. The
edge reciprocity [17] is quantified as the fraction r~n<
e =E, where
n<
e is the number of reciprocal edges and E is the total number of
edges in the network. The PGP network has a high value of
r~0:69. The reciprocity is distributed in a slightly heterogeneous
fashion across the network, as is shown in Fig. 8, where is plotted
the average reciprocity of the edges as a function of the in- and
out-degrees of the source vertex. It can be seen that the keys with
very few signatures tend to act in a very reciprocal manner,
whereas the more prolific signers receive less signatures back. This
heterogeneity is further amplified when one considers the in/out-
degree correlation between nearest-neighbours, as shown in Fig. 7,
where it is plotted the average in- and out-degree, SjTnn and
SkTnn, of the nearest out-neighbours of the vertices in the network,
as a function of the in- and out-degree of the source vertex, j and
k. The in/out-degree correlation shows an assortative regime for
intermediary in/out-degree values (*10 – 40), meaning that
vertices with higher in/out-degrees are connected preferentially
with other vertices with high degree, but also some dissortative
features for vertices with very high and very low in/
out-degrees, where vertices with low in/out-degree are connected
preferentially with vertices with high in/out-degree, and vice versa.
This mixed connectivity pattern leads to a very low scalar
assortativity coefficient [19] of a~0:0332(3), which is an
unusually small value for social networks [20] (the scalar
assortativity coefficient is defined for an undirected graph as
Figure 9. Two example communities of the PGP network, and their in- and out-degree distributions. The colors on the vertices
correspond to the top-level domain (TLD) of the email addresses. Top: Community containing the CACert.org certificate authority. Bottom:
Community composed mostly of Austrian email addresses (.at TLD).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g009
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where eij is the fraction of edges that
connect vertices of degrees i and j, qi~
X
j eji and sq is the
standard deviation of the distribution qi. This definition yields
values in the range a[½{1,1 , with a~{1 for networks which are
maximally dissortative, and a~1 for maximally assortative. For
the PGP network, the direction of the edges was ignored in the
calculation of a). These differences become more clear when one
investigates more closely the keys with the largest in-degree in the
network, as it is shown in table 2. As with the rest of the network,
most of the largest keys belong to individuals, with the exception of
the first and third keys with the most signatures, which belong to
entities. These entities are known as certificate authorities and are
created by organizations with the intent of centralizing certifica-
tion. The largest authority is the community-driven CAcert.org
which issues digital certificates of various kinds to the public, free
of charge (See the CAcert.org website: http://cacert.org). The
second largest authority is the German magazine c’t, which
initiated a PGP certification campaign in 1997 (A second, older c’t
key is also still among the largest hubs, with 289 signatures. See
http://www.heise.de/security/dienste/Krypto-Kampagne-2111.
html for more details). These authorities interact with individuals
in a different manner, acting as a central mediator between loosely
connected peers. This is evident by the low clustering coefficient
(c&0:003), which is one order of magnitude lower than the other
(human) hubs (c*0:05 – 0:11), and the average in-degree of their
out-neighbours, which is also significantly smaller than their
human counterparts (*17 vs. 60 – 80, respectively). These
different patterns represent distinct paradigms of trust organiza-
tion: Authority vs. Community-based; each with its set of
advantages and disadvantages. An authority-based scenario relies
on few universally trusted vertices which mediate all trust
propagation. In this way, the responsibility of key verification is
concentrated heavily on these vertices, which reduces the total
amount of verification necessary, and is thus more efficient. The
most obvious disadvantage is that the authorities represent central
points of failure: if an authority itself is not trusted, neither will be
the keys it certifies. Additionally, this approach may increase the
probability of forgery, since only one party needs to be deceived in
order for global trust to be achieved. The complementary scenario
is the community-based approach, where densely-connected
clusters of vertices provide certification for each other. This
obviously requires more diligence from the participants, but has
the advantage of larger resilience against errors, since the
multiplicity of different paths between vertices is much larger. In
the PGP network both these paradigms seem to be present
simultaneously, as can be observed in detail by extracting its
community structure [18]. This is done by obtaining the
community partition of the network which maximizes the
modularity Q of the network, defined as
Q~
1
2E
X
ij
Aij{
kikj
2E
  
d(si,sj), ð26Þ
where E is the total number of edges, Aij is the adjacency matrix
of the network, ki is the degree of vertex i, si is the community
label of vertex i and d is the Kronecker delta. According to this
definition, a partition with high values of Q is possible for networks
with densely-connected groups of vertices, with fewer connections
between different groups. The maximum value of Q~1 is
achieved only for "perfect" partitions of extremely segregated
communities. We note that the above definition is meaningful only
for undirected graphs, and thus we apply it to the undirected version
of PGP network, where the direction of the edges is ignored. We
used the method of Reichardt et al [21] to obtain the best
partition, which resulted in modularity value of Q&0:73.A sa
comparison, we computed the modularity for a shuffled version of
the network, where the edges were randomly placed, but the in/
out-degrees of the vertices were preserved, which resulted in the
significantly smaller value Q&0:03. The distribution of commu-
nity sizes seems to have a power-law tail with exponent *2:3
(*3:8 for the shuffled network), characterizing a scale-free
structure. By isolating the individual communities, one can clearly
see strong differences between those in the vicinity of the certificate
authorities and ‘‘regular’’ communities. In Fig. 9 is shown two
representative examples of these two types of communities: On top
is the community around the CAcert.org certificate authority, and
is composed of 677 keys, with an average 6:9 signatures per key. Its
in/out-degree distributions are shown on the side, from which the
large discrepancy between the most central vertex and the rest of
the community can be observed. The colors on the vertices
correspond to the Top-Level Domain (TLD) of the email
addresses associated with each key, and serve as a coarse
indication of the geographical proximity of the individuals. For
the community containing CAcert.org, a high degree of
geographical heterogeneity is present. This is corroborated also
by the fact that there are fewer direct edges between individuals.
Figure 10. Average best trust S SsT T and pervasive trust S StT T, as a function of the fraction of edges with absolute trust c, for the PGP
network. The different curves correspond to the different trust distribution scenarios described in the text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g010
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exclusively of keys with Austrian email addresses (.at TLD) which
show a completely different pattern, lacking any central authority.
It is smaller, with 287 keys, but denser, with 10 signatures per key.
This pattern is repeated for most of the largest communities in the
graph. Some non-centralized communities have a broader in/out-
degree distribution than the Austrian community, but only those
associated with certificate authorities display a centralized pattern
such as in the top of Fig. 9.
We now turn to the trust propagation on the PGP network.
2.2 Trust transitivity. In order to properly investigate trust
transitivity in the PGP network, it is necessary to know the direct
trust values associated with each signature, which indicate the level
of scrutiny in the key verification process. The OpenPGP standard
[13] defines four trust ‘‘classes’’ for signatures, according to the
degree of verification made. Unfortunately, these classes are
universally ignored, and most signatures fall into the ‘‘generic’’
class, from which no assertion can be made. Since the actual level
of verification of the keys is in fact unknown, we will investigate
hypothetical situations which represent different strategies the
PGP users may use to verify keys. In the last section we have
shown that the network is composed of different connection
patterns: community clusters and centralized trust authorities.
Depending on how these connection patterns are judged more
trustworthy, the values of transitive trust will be different. Here we
will consider three possible scenarios: 1. Random distribution, 2.
Authority-centered trust, and 3. Community-centered trust. In all
situations we will consider that all signatures have the same trust
value of c~1=2, except for a fraction c of edges which have
absolute trust c~1, which is selected as follows for each situation:
1. Random: The cE edges are chosen randomly among all E edges.
2. Authority-centered: The cE edges with the largest betweenness [22]
be are chosen, which is defined as
be~
X
i=j
sij(e)
sij
, ð27Þ
where si,j is the number of shortest paths from vertex i to j, and
sij(e) is the number of these paths which contain the edge e.
This distribution favours edges adjacent to nodes with high in/
out-degree, and also edges which bridge different communities.
3. Community-centered: The cE edges with the largest edge clustering te
are chosen, which is defined as
te~
P
i As(e),iAi,t(e) ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ks(e)jt(e)
p , ð28Þ
where s(e) and t(e) are the source and target vertices of edge e,
Ai,j is the adjacency matrix, and ji and ki are the in- and out-
degrees of vertex i, respectively. This quantity measures the
density of out-neighbours of the s(e) which are also in-
neighbours of t(e), and simultaneously the density of in-
neighbours of t(e) which are out-neighbours of s(e) (this
definition is equivalent to a normalized version of the edge
multiplicity defined in [23–25]). This distribution favours edges
with belong to densely-connected communities. For instance,
the edges of a clique (i.e. a complete subgraph) will all have the
value te~1{1=(n{1), where n is the size of the clique, which
will approach the maximum value te?1 for a sufficiently large
clique size.
In Fig. 10 it is shown the average best trust transitivity, Eq. 1
and average pervasive trust Eq. 7 for the PGP network, as a
function of c according to the different approaches. We note that
no discontinuous transition is seen. This is probably due to the
numerous topological differences from purely random networks
(i.e. correlations, reciprocity, community structure, clustering), as
described previously, as well as relatively small size of the
network, all of which may cause the transition to disappear. The
authority-centered trust leads to significantly higher values of SsT
and StT, and the community-based distribution to the lowest
values. This is expected, since distributing trust according to the
edge betweenness essentially optimizes trust transitivity, putting the
highest values along the shortest paths between vertices. The
Figure 11. Average best in-trust S SsinT T and pervasive in-trust S StinT T, as a function of the in-degree j and the fraction of edges with
absolute trust c, for the PGP network. The different plots correspond to the different trust distribution scenarios described in the text: (a)
Random distribution, (b) authority-centered distribution and (c) community-centered distribution. The plots (d) correspond to a community-centered
distribution, done on a shuffled version of network, with the same degree sequence.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018384.g011
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ing intra-community connections, and results in the lowest values
of average trust. Thus, favoring the hubs and authorities is clearly
more efficient, if the objective is solely to increase the average trust
in the network. However, pure efficiency may not be what is
desired, since it relies in the opinion of a much smaller set of
vertices, which eases the job of dishonest parties, which need only
to convince these vertices in order to be trusted by a large portion
of the network. Some of these issues become more clear by
observing how nodes with different in-degrees receive trust with
each of these strategies, as show in Fig. 11. More specifically,
what is shown is the average pervasive and best in-trust for vertices
with different in-degrees, which are respectively defined as
sin
v ~
X
u=v su,v=(N{1) and tin
v ~
X
u=v tu,v=(N{1), for a
given vertex v. For a random distribution of direct trust, the
vertices with higher in-degree receive a natural bias in the values
of average best in-trust, SsinT, since the shortest paths leading to
them tend to be smaller. But the fair nature of the definition of t
compensates for this, and the values of StinT are almost
independent of the in-degree of the vertices. The highly
connected nodes become more trusted only with the authority-
centred approach. Interestingly, in this situation the nodes with
the smallest in-degrees also receive a large value of trust, since
most of them are ‘‘fringe’’ nodes connected only with the hubs
(see Fig. 7). The vertices with intermediary in-degrees are thus left
in the limbo, and are in effect penalized for their community
pattern. The almost symmetrically opposite situation is obtained
with the community-centered trust distribution, where both the
vertices with smallest and largest in-degrees receive the smallest
trust values, and the intermediary nodes are judged more
trustworthy due to their strong communities. We note that this
effect is not due simply to the way the values of trust are
distributed, but depend strongly on the existence of communities
in the network. This is evident when the same trust distribution is
applied to a shuffled version of the network, with the same in/
out-degree sequence, as is shown in Fig. 11. For such a network,
the community structure disappears, and the highly connected
nodes come again in the lead.
Discussion
We investigated properties of trust propagation on network
based on the notion of trust transitivity. We defined a trust metric,
called pervasive trust which provides inferred trust values for pairs of
nodes, based on a network of direct trust values. The metric
extends trust transitivity to the situation where multiple paths
between source and target exist, by combining the best trust
transitivity to the in-neighbours of a given target node, and their
direct trust to the target. The trust values so-obtained are
unbiased, personalized and well defined for any possible network
topology. Equipped with this metric we analyzed the conditions
necessary for global trust propagation in large systems, using
random networks with arbitrary in/out-degree distributions as a
simple model. We analytically obtained the average best trust
transitivity (as well as pervasive trust) as a function of the fraction c
of edges with absolute trust c~1. We found that there is a specific
value of c~c , below which the average trust is always zero. For
c§c  the average value jumps discontinuously to a positive value.
Using the defined trust metric, we investigated trust propaga-
tion in the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) network [4,5]. We gave an
overview of the most important topological and dynamical
features of the PGP network, and identified mixed connectivity
patters which are relevant for trust propagation: namely the
existence of trust authorities and of densely-connected non-
centralized communities. Based on these distinct patterns, we
formulated different scenarios of direct trust distribution, and
compared the average inferred trust which results from them. We
found that an authority-centered approach, where direct trust is
given preferentially to nodes which are more central, leads to a
much larger average trust, but at the same time benefits nodes at
the fringe of the network, which are only connected to the
authority hubs, and for which no other information is available.
Symmetrically, a community-centered approach, where edges
belonging to densely-connected communities are favoured with
more trust, results in less overall trust, but both the fringe nodes
and the authorities receive significantly less trust than average.
These differences are not simply due to the different ways the
direct trust is distributed, but rather to the fact that the dense
communities and the trust authorities are somewhat segregated.
These differences illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of
both paradigms of trust propagation, which seem to be coexist in
the PGP network. It also serves as an insightful example of how
dramatically the direct trust distribution can influence the
inferred trust, even when the underlying topology remains the
same.
In this work, we have concentrated on static properties of trust
propagation. However most trust-based systems are dynamic, and
change according to some rules which are influenced by the trust
propagation itself. One particularly good example is market
dynamics [1,2] where sellers (or borrowers) do not perform well if
they have a poor track record, which will be partially influenced by
trust. Thus, it remains to be seen how trust transitivity can be
carried over to such types of models, and what role it plays in
shaping their dynamics.
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